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Abstract
We provide an explanation for why centralisation of political decision
making results in overspending in some policy domains, whereas too low
spending persists in others. We study a model in which delegates from
jurisdictions bargain over local public goods provision. If all of the costs
of public goods are shared through a common budget, policy makers dele-
gate bargaining to ‘public good lovers’, resulting in overprovision of public
goods. If a sufficiently large part of the costs can not be shared, under-
provision persists because policy makers delegate bargaining to ‘conserva-
tives’. We derive financing rules that eliminate the incentives for strategic
delegation.
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1 Introduction
Centralisation of political decision making often fails to produce the desired re-
sults. For instance, it is frequently argued that decision making within the Euro-
pean Union results in overspending and overregulation in some policy areas, while
too low spending and too little regulation persist in others (see, e.g., Alesina and
Wacziarg, 1999, Alesina, Angeloni, and Schuknecht, 2001). Even more puzzling,
in policy domains where it is hard to maintain that cooperation among the mem-
ber states of the EU brings large benefits, integration has progressed impressively.
For instance, the externalities on other countries that may not be taken into ac-
count under decentralised decision making - the raison d’être of centralisation-
seem relatively small in regional development policies, agricultural policy, and
social funds (Bertola, Jimeno, Marimon and Pissarides, 2001). In contrast, the
EU fails to make progress in areas where the coordination of national policies
would really help. This holds, for instance, for asylum policies and environmen-
tal policies. Why is there such an uneven balance in the results of centralisation
of decision making across policy domains?
Studies which try to explain failures of centralised decision making usually
rely on noncooperative behaviour of legislators in centralised decision making
bodies. For instance, it is well-known that if cost of public goods are financed
through a central budget, a common pool problem may arise. At a central level,
representatives will push for high spending on public goods which particularly
favour their jurisdiction because they only pay a part of the cost of public goods.
When central decisions are taken by majority rule, minimum winning coalitions
will form. Spending on local public goods in jurisdictions that belong to the
coalition will be excessively high at the expense of the jurisdictions outside the
coalition. From an ex ante point of view, policy outcomes are Pareto inefficient
(see Persson and Tabellini, 2000, chapter 7, for a survey of this literature).
Noncooperative approaches to the behaviour of legislators have been criticised
for several reasons. First, when the number of representatives is relatively small
(which is the case in, e.g., EU decision making), it is likely that they will exploit
the benefits of cooperation. Second, decisions in supranational bodies often re-
quire unanimity, thus forcing legislators to cooperate. In the EU, this holds for
policies falling under the heading of the second and third pillar.
Recently, Besley and Coate (2003) showed that even if agents in the central
decision making body behave cooperatively, suboptimal policy decisions may re-
sult. They develop a model in which delegates from jurisdictions bargain over the
amounts of public goods provided by the local governments. They show that over-
provision of public goods may result from strategic delegation by jurisdictions.
In their model, the rationale for centralised decision making is that local public
goods have positive spillovers effects on welfare in other regions. Decentralised
decision making therefore results in underprovision of public goods. Centralised
decision making completely resolves the externality problem provided that local
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policy makers delegate bargaining to agents who have the same preferences for
public goods as themselves. However, when the cost of public goods are shared
through a common budget, policy makers have an incentive to delegate bargain-
ing to ‘public good lovers’. The delegation of a person with strong preferences
for public goods serves to increase spending on local public goods at the expense
of the common budget. Since in equilibrium all districts send public good lovers,
strategic delegation results in overprovision of public goods.
In this paper, we extend the analysis by Besley and Coate (2003) to explain
why underprovision of public goods may persist under cooperative centralised
decision making. Because our set up is very close to theirs, the two papers may
serve as complements to explain why cooperation at a centralised level sometimes
results in overspending, whereas in other times it results in underspending. We
extend the model by allowing for cost which can not be shared among districts.
Examples of policy domains where non-shareable cost are important include envi-
ronmental policy (which impose indirect costs on local industries), asylum policies
(where short term adjustment costs may fall on local communities) and multi-
lateral efforts for peacekeeping (that may result in local casualties). We show
that if a sufficiently large part of the cost of public goods can not be shared
among regions, underprovision of public goods persists under centralised decision
making because local policy makers delegate bargaining to ‘conservatives’. Un-
derprovision of public goods is strongest when spillover effects are moderate. We
show that both in the absence of spillover effects and in the case of global public
goods, centralised decision making produces the socially optimal amounts of pub-
lic goods. Finally, we derive financing rules that eliminate strategic delegation
by local policy makers and thus promote efficient public goods provision.
2 Related Literature
A considerable body of literature on federalism shows why centralisation may
produce suboptimal policies. Many of the contributions are in the tradition of
Oates’ (1972) decentralisation theorem. An important assumption in Oates’ anal-
ysis is that centralisation implies policy uniformity. Then, as Oates shows, the
optimal political design of jurisdictions entails a trade-off between the benefits
of centralisation of policy making (e.g. economies of scale and internalisation
of externalities) and the costs of policy uniformity (a neglect of the diversity
in preferences for public goods). In Oates’ analysis, policies are set by a social
planner. More recently, attention has shifted to the political processes that gov-
ern policy choices and the incentives to centralise policy making (Alesina and
Spolaore, 1997, Bolton and Roland, 1997, Ellingson, 1998, Alesina, Angeloni,
and Etro, 2001a,b, Goyal and Staal, 2002). When policies are set according to
the wishes of a majority of voters in the federation, regions which have minority
preferences may be worse off under centralised decision making. This may give
regions an incentive not to join a federation even when potential efficiency gains
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are large. Recently, Gradstein (2000) argues that a commitment to an egalitarian
bargaining rule may be needed to extract the full benefits of centralisation and
to guarantee the political sustainability of centralised decision making.
Political-economic studies in the Oates’ tradition are well suited to explain
the cost of centralisation in policy domains where public goods can not be differ-
entiated according to the preferences of localities. However, in many cases it is
possible to decide centrally on geographically differentiated levels of public goods
in line with the diverse regional preferences and cultures. This opens up to redis-
tribution games among regions to gather in a larger share of central spending. In
Besley and Coate (2003), regions seek to attract a larger share of central spending
by delegating bargaining to public good lovers. In Persson and Tabellini (1994)
local policy makers use contributions to persuade the central legislator to allo-
cate public spending towards their region. As all regions non-cooperatively make
these contributions, in equilibrium the central legislator supplies too many local
public goods. Cheikbossian (2000) points out that supply decisions on public
goods are often taken at the local level. If these goods are financed through a
central budget, voters in each region have an incentive to appoint a public good
lover as their local policy maker.
In all these studies, centralisation of political decision making results in over-
provision of public goods. The main contribution of our paper is to examine under
what conditions underprovision of public goods may persist under centralised co-
operative political decision making. Two other recent papers have dealt with this
issue (Segendorff, 1998, and Brueckner, 2000). As in our paper, underspending
emerges because local policy makers delegate bargaining to conservatives, but
for different reasons. Segendorff (1998) assumes that the preferences of the del-
egates affect policy outcomes even in the case of a breakdown in negotiations.
Then, delegating bargaining to a conservative agent serves as a threat to the
delegate from the foreign region, and hence changes the bargaining outcome in
favour of the domestic policy maker. Brueckner (2000) allows for bargaining over
side-payments in addition to policies. He shows that to attract side-payments,
local policy makers delegate policy making authority to agents who favour the
status quo of low spending on public goods. In contrast to these studies and to
the study of Besley and Coate, our paper identifies the characteristics of policy
domains in which underspending or overspending is likely to occur.
3 The Model
The model revolves around political decision making on public goods provision in
two regions. Regions are identical and labelled i = 1, 2. Public goods provision
in one region has positive spillover effects on the utility of individuals in the other
region. The production of one unit of public goods in a region entails a per capita
tax cost of p. For convenience, taxes are non-distortionary. In addition, each unit
of public goods produced in a region has indirect per capita utility cost c for all
4
citizens in the region. For simplicity, we assume that indirect cost are linear in
public goods production. The difference between the tax cost p and the indirect
cost c is that tax cost can be shared between the regions through a common
central budget while indirect cost can not.
Individuals in each region differ in their preferences for public goods relative
to private goods. The utility function of individual j in region i is given by:
U ji = λ
j
i [b(gi) + κb(g−i)] + y − ti − cgi (1)
where gi is the amount of public goods provided in region i, y is gross per capita
income, and ti is the per capita tax in region i.1 Thus, y − ti is per capita con-
sumption of private goods in region i. When public goods are financed locally, the
per capita tax ti equals pgi. When tax cost are shared among the regions through
a common budget, ti = p2 (gi + g−i). In Section 7, we examine financing through
a common budget with more sophisticated sharing rules. As taxes are assumed
to be nondistortionary, we will henceforth omit the gross per capita income y.
The function b (·) is concave and increasing. The parameter λji ≥ 0 accounts for
differences in preferences for public goods relative to private consumption among
individuals in a region. Individuals in each region are symmetrically distributed
over the interval
£
λ, λ
¤
. The larger is an individual’s λ, the stronger her prefer-
ence for public goods. The parameter 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1 measures spillover effects. If
κ = 0, spillover effects are absent: individuals in region i do not care for public
goods provision in region −i. The larger is κ, the larger is the spillover effect. If
κ = 1, individuals care equally for the public goods produced in their own region
as they do for the public goods produced in the other region. Then, the public
goods may be called ‘global’ public goods.
The assumption of separability of local public goods in the utility function
(1) may be considered restrictive. In the Appendix, we examine an alternative
specification where local public goods are strategic substitutes.
4 The Social Optimum
Before we consider political decision making on public goods, we first derive
the socially optimal amounts of public goods. The social optimum serves as a
benchmark against which to evaluate the outcomes of political decision making
under different institutional structures. We define the social optimum as the
outcome which maximises the unweighted sum of utilities of all individuals in
both regions. Since individuals are symmetrically distributed over the interval£
λ, λ
¤
, and with population size normalised to one, social welfare is equal to the
sum of the utilities of the median voters in both regions. Hence, the socially
1Our set up differs slightly from that of Besley and Coate (2003) in the treatment of
spillovers. The utility from public goods in their model is λji [(1− κ) ln gi + κ ln g−i], implying
that the size of spillovers κ affects the trade-off between the domestic public good gi and private
consumption. This is not the case in our model.
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optimal amounts of public goods are found by maximising:
V s=λm1 [b(g1) + κb(g2)]− (p+ c) g1 (2)
+λm2 [b(g2) + κb(g1)]− (p+ c) g2
=λm(1 + κ)[b(g1) + b(g2)]− (p+ c) (g1 + g2)
where λm1 and λm2 are the median voter’s values of λ in region 1 and 2, respectively,
which are the same since regions are identical. Socially optimal public goods
provision is described by the following first-order conditions:
λm(1 + κ)b0 (g1)− p− c=0 (3)
λm(1 + κ)b0 (g2)− p− c=0
It is clear from (3) that the socially optimal amounts of g1 and g2 increase in
the intensity of the median voters’ preferences for public goods λm, increase in
spillovers κ, and decrease in the cost of public goods (p+ c).
5 Decentralised Decision Making
Under decentralised decision making, each region decides independently on the
provision of public goods. Public goods are financed locally. Hence, the per capita
tax ti equals pgi. We assume that in each region the policy maker’s preferences
coincide with the preferences of the median voter.2 Hence, the policy maker
chooses gi to maximise (1) where λji = λmi = the median λ in region i. The
policy maker in region i takes g−i as given when deciding on gi. Optimal public
goods provision in each region under decentralised decision making is described
by the first-order condition:
λmi b0 (gi)− p− c = 0 (4)
As in the social optimum, public goods provision under decentralised decision
making increases in the intensity of the median voter’s preferences for public
goods and decreases in the costs. In contrast to the social optimum, the amount
of public goods is independent of the size of the spillover effect κ. Comparing
(3) with (4), it follows that for κ > 0 decentralised decision making results in
underprovision of public goods. The intuition is clear. Since the policy makers
do not take into account the positive spillover effect of public goods on the utility
of the citizens in the foreign region, the supply of public goods is too low.
2If local public goods are strategic substitutes, voters have an incentive for strategic del-
egation, see the Appendix. As a result, underprovision is even more severe than in the case
described in the main text.
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6 Centralised Decision Making with Sincere Delegation
To resolve the problem of underprovision of public goods, the two regions may
decide to install a central government or a supra-national decision making body
to decide on local public goods provision. We assume that centralised decision
making is organised as follows. Each region appoints an agent to the central
decision making body. The agents from the two regions bargain over the levels
of g1 and g2. The tax costs of public goods, p(g1 + g2), are financed through
a common central budget. Hence, the per capita tax in each region is ti =
p
2
(gi + g−i). The indirect costs, cg1 and cg2, are borne locally.
Assume for the moment that policy makers delegate bargaining at the central
level to agents with the same preferences as their own. We refer to this case
as ‘sincere delegation’, as policy makers make no effort to misrepresent local
preferences for public goods. Following Besley and Coate (2003), we assume that
the bargaining outcome is given by the maximum of the sum of utilities of the
agents at the bargaining table:3
V c=λm1 [b(g1) + κb(g2)]−
p
2
(g1 + g2)− cg1 (5)
+λm2 [b(g2) + κb(g1)]−
p
2
(g1 + g2)− cg2
=λm (1 + κ) [b(g1) + b(g2)]− (p+ c) (g1 + g2)
Notice that V c is identical to the social welfare function V s given by (2). Hence,
centralised decision making with sincere delegation produces the socially optimal
levels of public goods described by (3). Centralisation of political decision making
thus completely resolves the externality problem, provided that delegation is
sincere. Recall that the social optimum maximises the sum of the utilities of
the median voters in the two regions. Since regions are identical, it follows that
both median voters are better off under centralised decision making with sincere
delegation compared to decentralised decision making.
7 Centralised Decision Making with Strategic Delegation
In this section, we relax the assumption that delegation is sincere. We show
that policy makers have an incentive to misrepresent their policy preferences
at the central level. As a result, under centralised political decision making
underspending may persist or overspending may arise.
To clarify the policy makers’ motives for misrepresenting their policy prefer-
ences, we first derive the amounts of public goods that would be set if one of the
3Alternatively, we could assume that the bargaining outcome is described by the Nash
bargaining function. This would give policy makers additional incentives to misrepresent their
policy preferences, particularly when the preferences of the delegates affect the policy makers’
outside options, as in Segendorff (1998), or when delegates also bargain about side-payments,
see Brueckner (2000).
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policy makers had complete control over central policy.4 Given that the direct
cost of public goods p are financed through a common budget while indirect cost
c are borne locally, the objective function of the policy maker from region i is:
V mi = λmi [b(gi) + κb(g−i)]−
p
2
(gi + g−i)− cgi (6)
The optimal levels of gi and g−i are described by:
λmi b0(gi)−
p
2
− c=0 (7)
λmi κb0(g−i)−
p
2
=0
Comparing (7) with (3), it is clear that even though centralisation increases both
policy makers’ welfare, individually optimal provision of public goods generally
diverges from the amounts arising under centralised decision making with sincere
delegation. This conflict of interest gives policy makers an incentive to distort
the central decision. Let us consider two special cases.
First, if indirect costs are zero, c = 0, all of the costs of public goods are
financed through a common budget. Then, unless κ = 1, the supply of domestic
public goods gi under centralised decision making is too low from the perspective
of the policy maker, while the supply of foreign public goods g−i is too high.
This is the common-pool problem: common financing drives a wedge between
the benefits and cost of local public goods. While the benefit of an increase in
public goods provision in one of the regions is largely region-specific, the cost is
spread over the two regions. Common financing therefore gives an incentive to
both policy makers to push for a higher supply of domestic public goods and
lower supply of foreign public goods. The only exception is when public goods
are ‘global’ public goods, κ = 1. Then, benefits and cost of public goods are
perfectly in line given that all cost are shared.
Second, if tax costs are zero, p = 0, all of the cost are borne locally. Then,
unless κ = 0, centralised decision making results in too high a level of domestic
public goods and too low a level of foreign public goods from the perspective
of each policy maker. Clearly, since all cost are borne locally, the policy maker
wants to free ride on an infinite amount of foreign public goods. The policy
maker wants to provide only a moderate amount of domestic public goods, viz.
the same level that arises under decentralised decision making (compare (7) with
(4)). Indirect cost thus give incentives to push for lower domestic public good
supply and for higher foreign public good supply. Given that p = 0, the only
case in which a policy maker does not have an incentive to move public goods
provision away from the social optimum is when spillovers are absent, κ = 0, i.e.
when the supply of public goods under centralised decision making coincides with
that under decentralised decision making.
4This case is close to Besley and Coate (2003)’s analysis of centralised decision making with
a noncooperative legislature.
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To bring the central decision on public goods provision closer to the policy
maker’s individual optimum, the policy maker may delegate bargaining at the
central level to an agent with preferences different from her own. We assume
that policy makers select the agents simultaneously and independently from each
other.5 Agents are selected from the regions’ populations. Recall that individuals
in each region differ only in their relative preference for public goods, given by
the parameter λ. We assume that citizens’ preferences are sufficiently varied so
that an interior solution to the policy maker’s selection problem is ensured.
As in the previous section, the bargaining outcome is given by the maximum
of the sum of utilities of the agents at the bargaining table:
V c = λd1[b(g1) + κb(g2)] + λd2[b(g2) + κb(g1)]− (p+ c)(g1 + g2) (8)
where λdi is the preference parameter of the agent appointed by region i’s policy
maker. Maximising (8) to g1 and g2 results in:£
λd1 + λd2κ
¤
b0(g1)− p− c=0 (9)
[λd2 + λd1κ]b0(g2)− p− c=0
The comparative statics are obtained by applying the implicit function theorem
to (9):
dg1
dλd1
=
b0(g1)
−[λd1 + λd2κ]b00(g1)
,
dg2
dλd1
=
κb0(g2)
−[λd2 + λd1κ]b00(g2)
, (10)
dg2
dλd2
=
b0(g2)
−[λd2 + λd1κ]b00(g2)
, and
dg1
dλd2
=
κb0(g1)
−[λd2 + λd1κ]b00(g1)
which are all positive. Hence, delegating bargaining to an agent with stronger
preferences for public goods results in an increase in both the domestic and the
foreign public good. The increase in domestic public goods provision is larger than
the increase in foreign public goods, unless public goods are global public goods
(κ = 1). It is also clear that the effect of policy maker i’s delegation decision on
the bargaining outcome depends on the other policy maker’s delegation decision.
Each policy maker selects a delegate λdi so as to maximise V mi given by (6).
Since selection takes place simultaneously and independently, each policy maker
takes as given the preferences of the delegate from the other region. In the
Nash-equilibrium, region 1’s policy maker’s selection decision is optimal given
5Clearly, the inefficiencies that arise from strategic delegation may be avoided by coordi-
nating the delegation decision. If both policy makers commit to sincere delegation, the central
bargain will produce the social welfare maximising level of local public goods. In practice,
however, it seems difficult to commit to such an agreement, as ex ante the preferences of the
domestic delegate (and, possibly, even those of the domestic policy maker) are difficult to assess
for foreign policy makers.
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the selection decision of region 2’s policy maker, and vice versa. Equilibrium is
described by the following first-order conditions:
λm1
·
dg1
dλd1
b0(g1) +
dg2
dλd1
κb0(g2)
¸
−
·
dg1
dλd1
+
dg2
dλd1
¸
p
2
− dg1
dλd1
c=0 (11)
λm2
·
dg2
dλd2
b0(g2) +
dg1
dλd2
κb0(g1)
¸
−
·
dg2
dλd2
+
dg1
dλd2
¸
p
2
− dg2
dλd2
c=0
Substituting (9) and (10) into (11), and imposing symmetry in equilibrium yields:
λdi =
·
2(1 + κ2)(c+ p)
(1 + κ)2p+ (1 + κ)2c
¸
λmi (12)
Clearly, it is generally not in the policy maker’s interest to delegate bargaining to
an agent with the same policy preferences as her own (λdi = λmi ). The delegation
decision depends crucially on the level of direct and indirect cost and the size of
the spillover effect.
As a benchmark, consider the Besley and Coate (2003) case in which all
cost are shared among the districts through a common budget (p > 0, c = 0).
Equation (12) then reduces to:
λdi =
·
2(1 + κ2)
(1 + κ)2
¸
λmi (13)
The term in large brackets is always greater than one unless κ = 1. Hence,
the policy maker has an incentive to delegate bargaining to a ‘public good lover’.
The reason is a common pool problem. Since all cost of public goods are financed
through a common budget, while benefits are — for κ < 1 — at least to some extent
region-specific, policy makers have an incentive to push for higher domestic public
goods supply and for lower foreign public goods supply. The delegation of a public
good lover has two effects. First, it results in an increase in the domestic public
goods provision. This raises the utility of the local policy maker. Second, it
results in an increase of foreign public goods provision. This lowers the utility
of the local policy maker. However, for κ < 1, domestic public goods provision
increases by more than foreign public goods provision (see (10)). Starting from
the equilibrium with sincere delegation, both policy makers have an incentive to
send an agent who cares more for public goods than they do themselves. In the
symmetric Nash-equilibrium, both policy makers send a public good lover. As a
result, there is overprovision of public goods. This follows from comparing (3)
with (9), with λd1 = λd2 given by (13). Overprovision is largest when κ = 0. Then,
λdi = 2λmi . The common pool problem is most severe in that case because sending
an agent with stronger preferences for public goods does not raise foreign public
good supply. The social optimum is immune to strategic delegation only when
public goods are global public goods (κ = 1). As we already argued above, when
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κ = 1 and c = 0, benefits and cost of public goods are perfectly in line. Hence,
there is no incentive to misrepresent policy preferences at the central level.
In the other extreme case, c > 0, p = 0, none of the cost of public goods are
shared through a common budget. Equation (12) then reduces to:
λdi =
(1 + κ2)
(1 + κ) λ
m
i (14)
Hence, sincere delegation (λdi = λmi ) is optimal only if κ = 0 and κ = 1. When
0 < κ < 1, the policy maker delegates bargaining to a ‘conservative’ agent, i.e.
someone who cares less for public goods than she does. Starting from κ = 0,
optimal ‘conservativeness’ first increases in κ (dλ
d
i
dκ < 0 for 0 < κ <
√
2 − 1)
and then decreases in κ (dλ
d
i
dκ > 0 for
√
2 − 1 < κ < 1). As we argued above,
policy makers have an incentive to move the outcome of centralised decision
making away from the social optimum. If all of the cost of domestic public goods
are borne domestically, policy makers have an incentive to distort the central
decision towards lower domestic public good supply and towards higher foreign
public good supply. Intuitively, the externality problem inherent to decentralised
decision making persists under centralised decision making. While regions fully
bear the cost of domestic public good supply, they only reap a part of the social
benefits. The negative gap between local benefits and local cost of domestic public
goods increases in the size of the spillover effect κ. This is the reason why optimal
conservativeness increases in κ for low values of κ. When κ becomes sufficiently
large, an other effect, working in the opposite direction, starts dominating and
optimal conservativeness decreases in κ. This is the effect of conservativeness on
foreign public good supply. By delegating bargaining at the central level to a
more conservative agent, both domestic and foreign public good supply decrease
(see (10)). The decrease in foreign public good supply is a cost to the policy
maker because she free rides on foreign public goods provision. This cost is
larger, the larger is the spillover effect κ. In the extreme case of κ = 1, policy
makers delegate bargaining to agents with the same preferences as their own, even
though each policy maker has an incentive to push for lower domestic public good
supply and for higher foreign public good supply. The reason is that sending a
more conservative agent reduces domestic and foreign supply by equal amounts
when κ = 1; see (10).6
In the general case where both p > 0 and c > 0, described by (12), it depends
on the magnitude of the cost parameters and the spillover effect whether pol-
icy makers have an incentive to delegate bargaining to public good lovers or to
conservatives. The larger are indirect cost relative to direct cost, the more conser-
vative are the preferences of the delegates. The effect of the size of spillovers on
6When local public goods are strategic substitutes, optimal conservativeness increases mono-
tonically in κ, as sending a more conservative delegate increases foreign public goods supply;
see the Appendix.
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the delegation decision depends on the relative importance of direct and indirect
cost. This is due to the ambiguous effect of κ on optimal delegate’s preferences in
the case c is large, see the discussion above. For various combinations of param-
eter values, the term in brackets in (12) is one. Hence, policy makers delegate
bargaining to agents with the same policy preferences as their own and the social
optimum is attained. This is the case if:
c
p =
1− κ
2κ (15)
If the left hand side of (15) is smaller than the right hand side, policy makers
appoint public good lovers, resulting in overspending. If the left hand side of
(15) is larger than the right hand side, conservatives are appointed, resulting in
underprovision of public goods.
By comparing equation (4) to (9) with λd1 = λd2 given by (12), we derive the
effect of centralisation of decision making on the amounts of public goods. The
level of gi is higher under centralised decision making if:
2(1 + κ2)(c+ p)
(1 + κ)p+ 2c > 1⇔ 2κ
2 (p+ c) + (1− κ)p > 0 (16)
which holds unless both κ and p are zero. If both κ and p are equal to zero,
centralisation of decision making does not affect public goods supply because i)
there are no externalities to internalise and ii) there is no common pool problem.
Depending on the values of c, p and κ, two types of strategic delegation may
occur. In the case of the delegation of public good lovers, both the internalisation
of externalities as well as the strategic delegation effect push up the level of public
goods as compared to the decentral equilibrium. In the case of the delegation
of conservatives, the effects work in opposite directions. The internalisation of
externalities pushes up the level of public goods, whereas the strategic delegation
mitigates this effect. However, for all κ > 0, the former effect outweighs the
latter, thereby increasing the level of public good supply.
Centralisation improves social welfare in each region if the increase in benefits
from higher levels of public goods are larger than the increase in costs. Recognise
that given symmetry the welfare of each individual median voter is at a maximum
at the social optimum. Although each policy maker has an incentive to delegate
strategically to alter the distribution of public goods in favour of her region,
they do not achieve this goal because both delegate strategically. In equilibrium,
welfare in both regions is lower than in the social optimum. To evaluate the effects
of centralisation on social welfare in each district, we substitute the levels of public
goods arising under centralised and decentralised decision making, respectively,
into (2). It follows that centralisation increases social welfare if:
12
λmi (1 + κ)[b(gci )− b(gdi )]− (p+ c) (gci − gdi ) > 0 (17)
where the superscript c denotes centralised decisions and d denotes decentralised
decisions. Again, there are two cases. If regions delegate bargaining to public
goods lovers, the supply of public goods will be higher than the social optimum.
As is shown by Besley and Coate (2003), for high levels of κ centralisation likely
improves welfare. The reason is that the benefits from internalising the exter-
nalities are large, whereas the distortion from strategic delegation is small. The
opposite is true for low levels of κ. Therefore, if regions delegate bargaining to pub-
lic goods lovers, centralisation is only welfare improving in policy domains that
have large externalities. If regions delegate bargaining to conservatives, under
centralised decision making the supply of public goods is lower than in the social
optimum, but higher compared to decentralised decision making. Therefore, even
though regions delegate bargaining to conservatives, centralisation improves the
welfare of each region.
8 Optimal Financing Rules
The previous section showed that when a large part of the total cost of public
goods are shared through a common budget, overprovision of public goods results
(except for the case κ = 1); underprovision occurs when a large part of the cost
are borne locally (except for κ = 0 and κ = 1). In this section, we derive financing
rules that eliminate the incentives for strategic delegation. When underprovision
of public goods persists under centralised decision making, an (additional) central
subsidy scheme which introduces (or magnifies) a positive budget externality
remedies the strategic delegation of conservatives. In the case of overprovision of
public goods, an additional central tax scheme restrains the policy makers from
delegating public good lovers.7
Consider the introduction of a central subsidy s > 0, or – in case s < 0 –
tax, on g1 and g2. We assume that the revenues of a tax are fully refunded to the
regions and that each region receives half of this fund. In case of a subsidy, each
of the regions pays half of the cost of the scheme. The objective function of the
delegate of region i is:
Udi = λdi [b(gi) + κb(g−i)]−
p
2
(gi + g−i)− cgi +
s
2
(gi − g−i) (18)
where the last term is the difference between region i’s subsidy revenues (sgi)
and the region’s contribution to the subsidy fund (s(gi+g−i)
2
).
7Similarly, one could adjust the share of the tax cost p that is financed through the central
budget in order to eliminate strategic delegation. Because we want to allow for the case p = 0,
we introduce an additional tax/subsidy scheme. At the end of this section, we derive which
part of the total cost of public goods must be shared so as to guarentee socially optimal public
goods supply, using our results for the optimal tax/subsidy scheme.
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As in the previous sections, the bargaining outcome is given by the maximum
of the sum of the utilities of the delegates. As is clear from (18), this sum is
independent of the level of the subsidy s. Hence, the subsidy scheme does not
affect the outcome of the bargaining by the delegates, given their preferences. The
subsidy scheme does, however, affect the policy makers’ delegation decisions. The
objective function of the policy maker in region i is:
Umi = λmi [b (gi) + κb (g−i)]−
p
2
(gi + g−i)− cgi +
s
2
(gi − g−i) (19)
Clearly, from the perspective of the policy maker in region i, a subsidy (tax) in-
troduces an additional benefit (cost) of units of gi and an additional cost (benefit)
of units of g−i. Equilibrium is described by the following first-order conditions:
0=λm1
·
b0(g1)
dg1
dλd1
+ κb0(g2)
dg2
dλd1
¸
−
·
dg1
dλd1
+
dg2
dλd1
¸
p
2
− dg1
dλd1
c (20)
+
·
dg1
dλd1
− dg2
dλd1
¸
s
2
0=λm2
·
b0(g2)
dg2
dλd2
+ κb0(g1)
dg1
dλd2
¸
−
·
dg2
dλd2
+
dg1
dλd2
¸
p
2
− dg2
dλd2
c
+
·
dg2
dλd2
− dg1
dλd2
¸
s
2
Substituting (9) and (10) into (20),8 and imposing symmetry in equilibrium gives:
λdi =
2(1 + κ2) (p+ c)
p(1 + κ)2 + 2c(1 + κ)− s(1− κ2)λ
m
i (21)
Clearly, the larger is s, the larger is the optimal value of λdi . A subsidy creates
a positive budget externality from domestic public goods supply. This induces
policy makers to delegate bargaining to less conservative agents so as to increase
domestic public goods supply. The only exception is when κ = 1. Then, the levels
of domestic and foreign public goods are equal, irrespective of the preferences of
the delegates (see equation (9)). Hence, in that case, the tax/subsidy scheme
does not affect the budgets of the local governments and, hence, the delegation
decision.
Denote s∗ as the optimal subsidy, that is, the subsidy that results in sincere
delegation by both policy makers (λdi = λmi ). The optimal subsidy (tax) is:
s∗ = −p(1− κ)− 2cκ
1 + κ (22)
8Recall that the bargaining outcome is independent of the tax/subsidy scheme. Hence, we
can use (9) and (10) to simplify (20).
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for any κ 6= 1.9 The optimal subsidy increases in c and κ and decreases in p.
To evaluate the properties of s∗, consider the situation where all costs of public
goods are financed through a common budget (p > 0, c = 0). In this case, (22)
reduces to:
s∗ = −p(1− κ)
(1 + κ) ≤ 0 (23)
Hence, in the absence of indirect cost and with κ 6= 1, a central tax (s∗ < 0) is
needed to eliminate the strategic delegation of public good lovers. The optimal
tax decreases in the level of spillovers. When spillovers are absent, the optimal
tax (s∗ = −p) implies that none of the cost of public goods are actually shared.
Centralised decision making with an optimal subsidy then results in the same
public goods supply as under decentralised decision making, which is socially
optimal in the absence of spillover effects. Common financing of all cost (s∗ = 0)
is only optimal in case of global public goods (κ = 1).
In the other extreme case where all of the cost of public goods are borne
domestically (c > 0, p = 0), (22) equals:
s∗ = 2cκ
1 + κ ≥ 0 (24)
Hence, for κ > 0, a subsidy is needed to induce policy makers to refrain from
delegating bargaining to a conservative agent. The subsidy increases in the size
of spillovers. This may come as a surprise since, starting from κ = 0, optimal
conservativeness of the delegate first increases in κ and, from κ =
√
2 − 1, de-
creases in κ (see Section 7). The reason is that the effectiveness of the subsidy in
changing the policy makers’ delegation decision reduces in κ. When κ is small,
sending a less conservative agent has a relatively large effect on the supply of the
domestic public good and a relatively small effect on the supply of the foreign
public good. The net additional receipts from the subsidy scheme are therefore
large when κ is low. When κ approaches unity, sending a less conservative agent
increases domestic and foreign public good supply by almost the same amount,
rendering the subsidy scheme close to budgetary neutral for each region. Hence,
a large subsidy per unit of public good is needed to offset a small distortion in
the policy maker’s delegation decision. When local public goods closely resemble
global public goods, the optimal subsidy approaches the total cost of public good
supply (s∗ → c). Hence, as for the case p > 0, c = 0, we conclude that sharing
all of the cost of public goods through a central budget is only optimal in case of
global public goods.
9Obviously, there does not exist an optimal level of s for κ = 1 because the tax/subsidy
scheme does not affect the delegation decision in that case. This is of no concern because
delegation is always sincere if κ = 1, see equation (12) in the previous section.
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Using (22), we can derive which part of the total cost of public goods must
be shared to guarantee socially optimal public good supply:
(p+ s∗) gi
(p+ c) gi
=
2κ
1 + κ (25)
Hence, sharing none of the cost is optimal only in the absence of spillovers, while
common financing of all cost is only optimal in case of global public goods.
The optimum financing rule described by (25) may not only be socially op-
timal, but also politically feasible. When deciding on the financing rule, local
policy makers recognise that equal amounts of public goods result for each re-
gion.10 They also recognise that over- or underspending emerges when financing
differs from the optimal financing rule. The policy makers will therefore decide
to implement the optimum financing rule.11
Sharing only a part of the cost of policies decided on at central level is widely
observed in practice. For instance, EU grants for local projects out of the Re-
gional Development Fund have to be matched by equal grants from national
governments, the so-called co-financing system. As DelRossi and Inman (1999)
show in an empirical study on US legislators’ demand for local public goods,
co-financing significantly reduces the legislators’ demand for centrally financed
projects. Bonuses to compensate for local indirect costs are less frequently ob-
served. One reason may be that non-shareable costs are difficult to quantify ex
ante and are probably hard to verify ex post. Hence, it may be politically difficult
to agree on them before decision making on the amounts of public goods starts.
9 Concluding Remarks
This paper provided an explanation for why in some policy domains cooperative
centralised decision making on local public goods leads to overspending, whereas
in other areas public spending on local public goods is too low. We argued that
if costs of local public goods are shared among participating regions through a
common budget, the delegation of public goods lovers leads to oversupply. If
a sufficiently large part of the costs are non-shareable, the delegation of con-
servatives results in underspending. Lastly, we derived cost sharing rules which
eliminate the incentives to delegate bargaining at the central level to agents with
preferences different from the domestic policy maker’s preferences.
10This will not be the case when the median voters in the regions differ in their preferences
for public goods. Then, policy makers will try to manipulate decision making on the financing
rule in order to bring the central decision closer to their preferences.
11Introducing separation of powers in the budgetary process may also contribute to efficient
provision of public goods. Chari et al. (1997) build a model where voters in each state delegate
spending-prone agents to Congress, but appoint a fiscally conservative President so as to curtail
excessive spending. In a model that mirrors decision making in the EU, Mazza and Van Winden
(2002) show that separation of powers, where the budget is set before the policy selection stage,
reduces the incentives to lobby for local public goods and therefore the size of spending at a
central level.
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Our analysis can be extended in several important ways. One is to incorporate
checks and balances. Chari et al. (1997) examine the role of a president as a
check on overspending. They allow for ‘split ticket’ voting on the preferences of
the delegates and the president. In the constitutional debate in the European
Union, it is still an open issue whether institutional reform should move towards
an elected head of the European Commission, who may serve as a check on the
members of the Commission delegated by the member countries.
A second extension is to allow for interregional heterogeneity in preferences
and/or differences in local costs of public goods. Differences in non-shareable
costs across regions may add to our understanding of why it is so difficult to
agree on common policies. For instance, the reluctance of the US to sign the
Kyoto protocol may have more to do with the relatively high costs for growing
US industries to comply with restrictive global emission standards, than with
weak preferences of the US electorate for environmental protection.
Another interesting extension of the model would be to allow for more than
two countries. This seems especially relevant in the light of the enlargement
process in the EU. Member states that benefit heavily from policies that are
commonly financed fear that enlargement may erode their privileged position,
and reduce the possibility of deepening cooperation. Further, countries that
have strong preferences for environmental protection fear that enlargement may
lower the common standards in this domain. Therefore, enlargement may change
the attitudes of local policy makers towards policy making in Brussels and may
influence their delegation decision.
Our analysis has shed light on problems that arise with ‘cooperative policy
coordination’, a phenomenon that has become more important over time. In-
creased interdependence creates incentives for policy coordination at a regional
and global level, for instance in the case of environmental degradation or coping
with large numbers of refugees. On most of these issues, policy makers cooperate
in the international arena through policy coordination, not through cost sharing.
Our model seems to be well placed to explain the inefficiencies that may arise in
political decision making when countries decide to cooperate, but do not share.
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11 Appendix
This Appendix studies the case where local public goods are strategic substitutes.
Using the same notation as in the main text, the utility function is given by:
U ji = λ
j
ib(gi + κg−i) + y − ti − cgi (A1)
The Social Optimum. Socially optimal public goods provision is described by:
λmb0 (g1 + κg2) + κλmb0 (g2 + κg1)− p− c=0 (A2)
λmb0 (g2 + κg1) + κλmb0 (g1 + κg2)− p− c=0
Decentralised Decision Making. When local public goods are strategic sub-
stitutes, voters have an incentive to delegate policy making to an agent with
preferences different from their own. Given g−i, policy maker i’s optimal public
good supply is described by:
λpi b0(gi + κg−i)− p− c = 0 (A3)
where λpi denotes the preferences of the policy maker in region i. Given the pref-
erences of the policy maker in region −i, the median voter’s optimal preferences
of the policy maker in region i are described by:
∂Umi
∂λpi
= λmi
·
dgi
dλpi
b0(gi + κg−i) +
dg−i
dλpi
κb0(gi + κg−i)
¸
− dgidλpi
(p+ c) = 0 (A4)
where, using (A3):
dgi
dλpi
=
b0(gi + κg−i)
−λpi (1− κ2) b00(gi + κg−i)
> 0 (A5)
dg−i
dλpi
=−κ dgidλpi
< 0
Delegating policy making to an agent with stronger preferences for public goods
increases domestic public goods supply, but reduces public goods supply in the
foreign region. Substituting (A5) in (A4), and using (A3) to simplify, results in:
λpi = (1− κ2)λmi (A6)
For any κ > 0, the median voter delegates policy making to someone who cares
less for public goods than she does. The reason is clear. Given the preferences
of the foreign policy maker, delegating to a more conservative agent implies less
domestic public goods, but this is partly compensated for by higher foreign public
goods supply. If local public goods are near perfect substitutes (κ approaches
1), a reduction in gi is almost completely compensated for by an increase in
g−i, resulting in delegation to an extremely conservative policy maker. Clearly,
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underprovision of public goods is more severe than in the case described in the
main text as, in addition to the externality problem, voters appoint conservative
policy makers when local public goods are strategic substitutes.
Centralised Decision Making. Public goods provision resulting from the bar-
gain between the delegates from the two countries is described by:
λdi b0(gi + κg−i) + κλd−ib0(g−i + κgi)− p− c = 0 (A7)
Given the preferences of the foreign delegate, optimal preferences of the domestic
delegate are given by:
∂Umi
∂λdi
= λmi
·
dgi
dλdi
b0(gi + κg−i) +
dg−i
dλdi
κb0(gi + κg−i)
¸
− dgi
dλdi
³p
2
+ c
´
− dg−i
dλdi
p
2
= 0
(A8)
Using (A7) to find the values of dgidλdi
and dg−idλdi
, and imposing symmetry in equilib-
rium, we obtain:
λdi =
2(1− κ2)(c+ p)
(1− κ2)p+ (1 + κ)2cλ
m
i (A9)
As in the main text, we find that the policy maker delegates bargaining to a
public good lover when c = 0, while she delegates bargaining to a conservative
when p = 0. If all of the cost are shared (c = 0), then λdi = 2λmi for all κ < 1. The
intuition is clear. Compared to the bargaining outcome with sincere delegation,
each policy maker desires higher domestic public goods supply and lower foreign
public goods supply. Given the preferences of the other delegate, delegating to
an agent with λdi = 2λmi increases gi up to the policy maker’s optimal level (a
delegate with λdi > 2λmi would oversupply gi even if all costs are shared) and
reduces the level of g−i. Hence, by delegating to an ‘extreme lover’ of public
goods, the policy maker kills two birds with one stone. This is in contrast to the
case in the main text, where delegating to a public good lover increases foreign
public good supply as well.
If the cost of public goods provision are non-shareable (p = 0), for all κ > 0
there is conservative delegation, as in the main text. However, in contrast to
the results in the main text, optimal conservativeness increases monotonically in
κ. The intuition is that when public goods are strategic substitutes, sending a
more conservative delegate increases the level of g−i. In the limiting case where
κ approaches 1, policy makers delegate bargaining to agents who do not care for
public goods at all, so as to ‘force’ a large increase in public goods provision in
the other region. Since both policy makers do, no public goods are supplied, as
under decentralised decision making, see (A6).
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